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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY 
Adaptation to climate change is gaining increasing relevance in the public debate of climate 
policy. Thus, knowledge of costs and benefits of adaptation measures is of high importance. 
This study compiles existing cost estimates for adaptation measures in Europe. The 
systematic approach of the literature review points out sectoral and regional knowledge gaps 
in the adaptation research as well as high uncertainties. In particular, adaptation costs for the 
transport and human health sectors are scarce, although high adaptation costs can be expected 
in these impact sectors in the next decades.  
Based on the literature review of adaptation costs, the study furthermore asks how and to 
which extent public budgets are affected by adaptation – an issue which has been broadly 
unexplored by existing literature to date. At first, we analyse qualitatively by which channels 
adaptation influences the public budgets. In the next step, we present theory-, literature- and 
data-based guesses for the public shares of total adaptation costs in each of the most affected 
economic sectors. Linking these shares with the literature-based cost estimates allows a first 
insight into the magnitude of future public adaptation expenses by sector.  
The results are reflecting the high uncertainties and large knowledge gaps inherent in 
economic impact analyses of climate change issues. However, some conclusions can be 
drawn: High public costs may mainly be expected in flood protection and the transport sector. 
The annual costs for adaptation to climate change may amount to up to 4 bn € in the 2060s, 
and 5.7 bn € in 2050, respectively. In the agriculture sector higher total adaptation costs may 
occur, albeit paid by the public purse only to a minor degree. On the contrary, negative 
adaptation costs (i.e. saved expenses due to adaptation) are also expected, particularly through 
less heating demand. These savings of expenses can reach the notable amount of 4.2 bn € in 
2050, although with a high regional heterogeneity within Europe. 
A synopsis of the findings reveals the need for further research in the quantification of 
adaptation costs and benefits as well as the high relevance of climate change adaptation for 
future public budgets in Europe. 
  
DAS WICHTIGSTE IN KÜRZE 
Die Anpassung an die Folgen des Klimawandels nimmt neben der Vermeidung von 
Treibhausgasen eine immer wichtigere Rolle in der Debatte um den Klimawandel ein. 
Aussagen über Kosten und Erlöse von Anpassungsmaßnahmen sind daher von großer 
Bedeutung. Diese Studie führt vorhandene Literatur über Kostenschätzungen der Anpassung 
in Europa zusammen und zeigt dabei sektorale und regionale Wissenslücken auf. 
Beispielsweise sind nur sehr wenige Kostenschätzungen in den Sektoren Verkehr und 
Gesundheit vorhanden, obwohl Europa erwartungsgemäß hier in den nächsten Jahrzehnten 
mit hohen Anpassungskosten konfrontiert sein wird.  
In einem zweiten Teil befasst sich die Studie als eine der ersten Arbeiten mit den 
Auswirkungen von Anpassungsmaßnahmen auf die öffentlichen Haushalte in Europa. 
Zunächst werden in einer qualitativen Analyse die unterschiedlichen Wirkungskanäle von 
Anpassung auf die Staatsbudgets aufgezeigt. Darauf aufbauend werden theorie-, literatur- und 
datengeleitete Einschätzungen für einen staatlichen Anteil der gesamten Anpassungskosten in 
den am meisten betroffenen Wirtschaftssektoren gegeben. Eine Kopplung dieser Staatsanteile 
mit den im ersten Teil zusammengestellten Ergebnissen der Literaturrecherche ermöglicht die 
teilweise Abschätzung von öffentlichen Ausgaben, die in den nächsten Jahrzehnten in Europa 
für die Anpassung an den Klimawandel nötig werden.  
Die Ergebnisse sind geprägt von der hohen Unsicherheit, die in der Analyse ökonomischer 
Folgen des Klimawandels immanent ist. Jedoch kristallisieren sich einige Schlussfolgerungen 
heraus: Öffentliche Kosten für Anpassung an den Klimawandel entstehen v.a. in den Sektoren 
Küstenschutz und Verkehr (bis zu 4 Mrd. € p.a. in den 2060ern bzw. bis zu 5,7 Mrd. € im Jahr 
2050). Im Agrarsektor können u.U. höhere Kosten entstehen, die jedoch größtenteils privat 
getragen werden. Negative Anpassungskosten (d.h. durch Anpassung eingesparte Ausgaben) 
können durch eingesparte Heizkosten in beträchtlicher Höhe (bis zu 4,2 Mrd. € im Jahr 2050) 
auftreten, wobei hier in Nord- und Südeuropa sehr unterschiedliche Effekte erwartet werden.  
Im Gesamtbild zeigt die Analyse einen hohen Forschungsbedarf im Bereich der 
Kostenabschätzung von Anpassungsmaßnahmen an den Klimawandel und die hohe Relevanz 
des Themas für die öffentlichen Haushalte.  
  
Total Costs and Budgetary Effects  
of Adaptation to Climate Change:  
An Assessment for the European Union 
 
 
 
 
Daniel Osberghausa, Christiane Reif 
(ZEW Mannheim) 
 
 
 
July 2010 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Adaptation to climate change is gaining increasing relevance in the public debate of climate 
policy. However, detailed and regionalised cost estimates as a basis for cost-benefit-analyses 
are rare. We compose available cost estimates for adaptation in Europe, and in particular 
Germany, Finland and Italy. Furthermore, a systematic overview on fiscal aspects of 
adaptation is provided, with focus on budgetary effects of adaptation in the different impact 
sectors. Combining cost estimates, considerations on fiscal aspects and governmental 
interventions in adaptation processes, we present data-based guesses of public adaptation 
costs in the EU, divided by impact sectors. The findings show an expectedly large public 
burden in the adaptation of transport infrastructure and coastal protection, while high 
adaptation costs in the agriculture sector are predominantly private. The change in energy 
demand may well lead to a significant decrease in public expenditure. Considering the 
regional heterogeneity of adaptation measures and the high uncertainty of quantitative 
adaptation analyses, further research in the form of bottom-up-studies is needed. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Beside the mitigation of greenhouse gases, adaptation is another way to respond to climate 
change. The IPCC defines adaptation as the “Adjustment in natural or human systems in 
response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or 
exploits beneficial opportunities.” (IPCC 2007, p. 869). Although this definition has its 
strength in the inclusion of both observed and expected climate change, as well as covering 
both positive and negative climate impacts, it also leaves some open questions. In particular, 
when applying the definition to observed activities, it often remains unclear whether activities 
are solely attributed to climatic stimuli. It may also be the case that structural changes, 
economic development, changes in risk perception or other non-climate-related triggers play a 
role. This fundamental problem of defining adaptation may be one main reason for the current 
scarcity of quantitative data on adaptation measures and their costs.  
Adaptation can be classified according to the actors and the time horizon. In the according 
literature we find the expressions private, individual, decentralised or autonomous adaptation 
for such adaptation measures which constitute private goods and are regularly taken by 
private actors (Mendelsohn 2000, Fankhauser 1998, OECD 2008). The existence (and in 
some impact sectors the predominance) of private adaptation options reveals one main 
difference to mitigation efforts, which are characterised by the existence of large-scale public 
interventions (Tol 2005). But there are also adaptation measures which call for collective 
action, since beneficiaries and decision makers are not totally identical. There are different 
expressions to be found in the literature, with different accentuations. Joint and collective 
adaptation highlight the difference to private adaptation and the need for collective action 
(which can principally be organised by privates), whereas planned, governmental and public 
adaptation imply that these activities are taken by some governmental entity (Mendelsohn 
2000, IPCC 2007, Dannenberg et al. 2009, Smith et al. 2009). Regarding the time horizon, 
one can distinguish proactive and reactive adaptation (Fankhauser 1998). The former means 
adaptation to expected future climatic changes, whereas the latter reacts to observed climate 
change.  
This paper focuses on the fiscal effects of adaptation to climate change. Beside adaptation 
induced effects, climate change has other fiscal implications, like public spending for 
mitigation efforts, the implementation and use of fiscal instruments in climate policy, or 
reduced tax revenue due to productivity losses in the economy. Concentrating on adaptation, 
we will proceed as follows: In the next section we will summarise available cost estimates for 
adaptation measures in Europe. The fiscal aspects of adaptation will be analysed and 
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categorised in section 3, followed by an argumentation where public involvement in 
adaptation is reasoned. After laying the theoretical and empirical ground, we will then draw 
conclusions regarding the direct fiscal adaptation costs in various impact sectors in Europe in 
section 4.2. Section 5 summarises the main findings. 
 
2. ADAPTATION COSTS IN EUROPE – A LITERATURE REVIEW IN MATRIX FORMAT 
We compile the results from a literature review on adaptation costs in Europe, all in p.a.-
values in € in prices of 2005. Beside studies covering all of Europe, we also include 
quantitative estimates for three exemplary countries from different climatic zones, namely 
Finland, Germany and Italy. Thereby we also show research foci and knowledge gaps and 
present the current state of research with regard to adaptation costs in Europe, in both bottom-
up and top-down studies. 
Studies focussing on the vulnerability to climate change mostly incorporate adaptation needs 
and often stress the case for a proactive, precautionary climate policy which includes 
adaptation. However, although most scholars propose a cost-benefit-approach to find the 
optimal adaptation path, the knowledge of concrete adaptation costs is limited, as can be seen 
by many empty gaps in the matrix. Furthermore, results base on different scenarios and time 
horizons.  
It should be stated that almost all data and estimates are direct adaptation costs, which do not 
include indirect costs resulting from forgone profits or feedback effects on consumption due 
to altered investment and consumption behaviour (opportunity costs). Only very few studies 
try to give an insight into these effects, for example Bosello et al. (2007) through a CGE 
approach. These indirect effects might be considerable in many cases. Unfortunately, the 
current state of research does not allow a reasonable statement concerning indirect effects. So 
we are forced to focus on direct adaptation costs which result from simple investment or 
maintenance costs.  
For the detailed matrix and more information on it, e.g. about annualisation, exchange rates 
and inflation, we refer to the appendix of this paper. 
 
3. FISCAL AND BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS OF ADAPTATION – AN OVERVIEW 
The differentiation between “fiscal” and “budgetary” is crucial to determine the scope of this 
paper. Before turning to budgetary effects in detail, it has to be clarified how they can be 
structured and how they are related to the frequently used term “fiscal implications”.  
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Fiscal policy means governmental action to influence the economy by public expenditure and 
income (Mankiw 2003). This means fiscal implications encompass both fiscal instruments to 
pursue certain policy targets as well as effects on the government’s balance. In the literature, 
we can find mainly two different concepts of the terms “fiscal implications” or “fiscal 
effects”. Some authors refer to impacts that fiscal policy has on other variables (e.g. fiscal 
effects on mortgage debt or independence of the central bank; see Bell and Wray 2002, 
Wolswijk 2005). These concepts highlight the importance of fiscal instruments in the fiscal 
implication analysis. However, most authors understand fiscal effects as an impact of an 
exogenous variable (some policy, some shock or a gradual development) on the government’s 
expenditure and revenue, so the main focus is actually the effect on the government’s budget 
(e.g. Matsusaka 1995, Swaroop et al. 2000, Storesletten 2000). To make the difference 
between these two concepts clear, we will refer to the latter as analysis of “budgetary effects” 
instead of using the term “fiscal”. In contrast to the definition of fiscal policy, the concept of 
budgetary effects neglects the targets pursued by the fiscal policy and solely analyses changes 
in government’s expenditure and revenue flows. Likewise, in this contribution we will stick to 
this concept and focus just on the budgetary effects of adaptation to climate change. Fiscal 
instruments related to adaptation are not of relevance for this paper and remain an issue of 
future research. 
The sign of the total impact of adaptation on the public budgets is not clear. Compared to a 
baseline scenario with climate change but without adaptation, it can be positive as long as 
adaptation yields net benefits (mainly in the form of reduced or avoided damages) and thereby 
increases the total economy’s productivity. But if, where, when and to which extent these 
benefits occur, is by no means certain (Heal and Kriström 2002, Patt et al. 2009, World Bank 
2009). Given the high uncertainty of future climate impacts the total budgetary effects of 
adaptation may also be negative, even when benefits of adaptation are taken into account. As 
an example think of the construction costs of a dike in expectation of a rising sea-level, and 
after the construction it turns out that the sea-level does not rise to the expected extent. 
As a first step to assess budgetary effects, this contribution will concentrate on the effects of 
adaptation costs, mostly ignoring the benefits. This basically has two reasons: First, the 
magnitude of benefits is highly uncertain (Patt et al. 2009, World Bank 2009). While there are 
quite reasonable estimates of adaptation benefits for some specific adaptation measures 
(Bosello et al. 2009), the potential of mitigating climate damage of most measures is very 
uncertain. An example is adaptation of infrastructure which can make up to two thirds of 
global adaptation costs in 2030 (UNFCCC 2007). The benefits of these activities hinge on 
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several unknown factors like future frequency and severity of extreme weather events and the 
effectiveness of technical measures to adapt buildings. Also the well-developed research field 
of agricultural adaptation does not give a clear answer regarding the effectiveness of 
adaptation. Estimates of the adaptation effectiveness have a great variance (IPCC 2007, p. 
286). Hence, an economy-wide comprehensive quantitative analysis of adaptation benefits is 
not applicable by now, which suggests focussing on adaptation costs.  
The second reason comes from the intertemporal heterogeneity of adaptation. One can assume 
that costs arise today, whereas most benefits occur in later periods (Fankhauser et al. 1999, 
Mendelsohn 2000). The same holds true for negative and positive budgetary effects, 
respectively. Although public budgets can comparably easily smooth income over time, the 
short term balance of public budgets is still an issue of interest, at least in the face of the 
European stability and growth pact, which i.a. schedules a procedure in order to prevent 
excessive deficits (more than 3% of GDP) in the Euro-area (European Council 1997). 
Therefore, the short term budgetary impacts of adaptation costs are indeed of interest, even in 
the absence of a comprehensive long-term-oriented cost-benefit-analysis. 
We will furthermore restrict our analysis to an aggregate view of public budgets. In Europe 
there are authorities on multiple levels with specific budgetary responsibilities and 
characteristics. Determining which federal level is in charge for which policy measure is 
rarely an easy task (see e.g. Farber 2009 as a contribution with regard to adaptation). For the 
different public actors, like municipalities, states, countries or supranational communities it 
matters on which level the responsibility is taken. These questions often give rise to 
controversial debates. However, we will view the public planner as one, neglecting these 
issues of federal division of responsibilities, in order to get a first insight into the budgetary 
effects connected to adaptation. After this first step, the disaggregation into the relevant fiscal 
levels would be an essential task for future research. 
Impacts on the government’s budget due to adaptation can be disentangled in direct and 
indirect effects (or first and second round effects). Direct effects mainly affect government’s 
expenditure, and result e.g. from public investments in adaptive infrastructure or subsidies for 
private adaptation measures. These expenditures are surely the most obvious and visible 
budgetary effects, though they do not have to be the highest. Many will think of rising 
expenditures, like additional investment in dike construction or in transport infrastructure. 
However, one can also think of declining expenditures, e.g. in the field of heating energy for 
public buildings or winter road maintenance. Though these measures do not constitute new 
activities, the reduction of these services can also be defined as adaptation in the sense of the 
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IPCC definition (IPCC 2007, p. 869). The direct net effect of adaptation is therefore difficult 
to predict theoretically, but the results of a literature review presented in part 2 of this paper 
suggest clearly negative impacts on public budgets in Europe. Even more can be expected for 
other countries, as climate damages are relatively higher in many non-European countries. 
Indirect effects, in contrast, become relevant when adaptation (whether private or public) as a 
side effect changes the tax revenue. To highlight the potential importance of indirect 
budgetary effects, we will have a brief look at the results of Bräuer et al. (2009), who 
analysed budgetary effects of climate change (not only adaptation) in Germany. The authors 
conclude that the indirect effects on public budgets – like reduced tax revenues – may amount 
to approximately 87% of the total. For the case of adaptation the net budgetary impact of 
these second-round effects is not obvious. We will disentangle the indirect effects in the 
subsequent sections. 
In basic economic theory, it is assumed that companies adapt only if adaptation increases their 
profitability (see e.g. Mendelsohn 2000, OECD 2008). Compared to a scenario with climate 
change but without adaptation, the simplifying assumption of efficient adaptation suggests a 
clearly positive impact on tax revenue. However, considering timing, uncertainty and other 
sources of inefficiency, net effects on the public budgets may also be negative. Short-term 
negative impacts may arise from adaptation measures which cost (and thereby reduce the 
taxable income) today, while the benefits may only occur in the long run (Fankhauser et al. 
1999). Uncertainty of future climate impacts and consequently of the effectiveness of 
adaptation yields further risks of costs exceeding benefits even in the long run (Mendelsohn 
2000, OECD 2008). Moreover, myopic behaviour of companies and individuals as well as 
financial constraints may hamper efficient adaptation processes. If these drawbacks reduce the 
company’s overall productivity, the tax revenue also tends to decline. 
So far we only considered the impact on the company-level. We will now turn to the total 
economy. As company resources are limited, funds that have been spent for any non-adaptive 
activity X, must now be spent on adaptation (activity A). Effectively, demand shifts from the 
sector providing activity X to the sector providing activity A. Given different effective tax 
rates for different sectors, the tax revenue may change due to a shift of production towards 
adaptation-oriented sectors (e.g. construction or manufacture). In other words, the sign of the 
indirect budgetary effects of autonomous adaptation hinges on the question whether 
production in the adaptation-oriented sector A yields relatively higher or lower tax revenue 
than the sector X where demand declines.  
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Under certain conditions an adaptation-induced shift of production can also lead to changes in 
the sectoral employment, such that labour demand follows the demand shift. This, in turn, can 
have positive or negative impacts on the government’s budget, depending on the sector-
specific labour market situation.  
Further indirect effects may arise in the context of open economies. A country with a 
relatively high competitiveness in adaptation technologies will possibly gain earnings from a 
global increase of adaptation demand, and probably achieve higher public revenues. On the 
contrary, countries which import adaptation technologies and where adaptation demand 
crowds out domestic demand would feel additional pressure on their productivity and 
consequently budgets.1 
Another aspect still has to be tackled: an important part of every binding international climate 
agreement, whenever it will be accomplished, will be payments of industrialised countries to 
developing countries. Estimates of the financial needs for adaptation in developing countries 
range from 27 billion USD p.a. around 2030 (UNFCCC 2007, aggregated by Parry et al. 
2009) to more than 100 billion USD p.a. between 2010 and 2050 (World Bank 2009). The 
latter figure translates in almost a doubling of the current development aid, emphasising the 
tremendous magnitude of the task. These costs will undoubtedly go far beyond the capacity of 
the public budgets in the affected countries, so that at least parts of these costs may be borne 
by highly-developed countries.2 The additional burden will strain their public budgets, besides 
the effects of domestic adaptation. Note that the indirect effects of exported adaptation 
technology may mitigate the negative impacts (Mendelsohn 2000 mentions this phenomenon 
with a negative connotation).  
In this section we gave a short overview on what fiscal implications with regard to adaptation 
may actually mean. First, we distinguished fiscal implications (which may incur budgetary 
effects as well as fiscal instruments and have to be seen in connection to policy targets) from 
sole budgetary effects. We furthermore described direct vs. indirect budgetary effects of 
adaptation and mentioned the probably high relevance of a binding international adaptation 
funding agreement. In the next section, we will deepen the analysis in one specific kind of 
budgetary effects, and introduce a method to reasonably guess the actual public burden of 
adaptation. 
                                                 
1 However, the export of high technology based adaptation techniques always bears the risk of technology theft 
which may hamper the willingness of private companies to engage in international markets. This is not being 
considered here. 
2 The reasons why highly-developed countries should finance adaptation in other countries partly ground in 
international equity rationales and partly arise from considerations of future international migration and trade 
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4. AN ANALYSIS OF THE PUBLIC SHARES OF SECTORAL ADAPTATION COSTS  
For the remainder of the paper we will focus on one specific part of the budgetary effects, 
namely direct expenditures for adaptive investments by the public sector. The reason for this 
limitation is mainly the current state of data. Although indirect effects may have a high 
relevance for the sustainability of public budgets, quantitative data are sparse or non-existent. 
However, though the limitation on direct expenditures may be a serious drawback in terms of 
budget forecast, it still allows the introduction of a method which is new in literature and 
gives first insights into possible budgetary burdens due to adaptation.  
We will base our analysis on an approach firstly used by IMF (2008). The authors present 
expected public adaptation investments in some of the impact sectors by using absolute 
adaptation cost estimates by UNFCCC (2007) and applying rough sector-specific ratios of 
public engagement. We will develop this method further by including more impact sectors 
and introducing theoretically and empirically grounded determinants for public shares in each 
impact sector. In section 4.1, possible reasons for public intervention in adaptation processes 
are shortly identified, leading to a proposed public share of adaptation costs in section 4.2. 
Consecutively, these ratios combined with the adaptation costs from the literature give first 
quantitative insights into direct budgetary effects of adaptation to climate change.3 
 
4.1. Theory of public adaptation 
The differentiation of public and private adaptation is crucial for determining the budgetary 
effects of adaptation. In cases where the government takes the responsibility it may come to 
direct public expenditures. Governmental intervention into markets can be reasoned by (a) 
market failures, (b) equity aspects and (c) security of supply considerations. Budgetary effects 
can furthermore occur if governmental entities engage in economic behaviour like private 
shareholders.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
developments. They are, however, not the topic of this paper. The point here is simply that remittances will add 
to the budgetary burden in developed countries. 
3 Due to a lack of detailed data, we could not use the cost estimates in the cross-sectoral impact sector “Extreme 
weather events”. Admittedly, according to the literature review the highest adaptation costs may be expected 
there. But as there is no information available which actors are affected by these costs and how exactly the costs 
arise, it is to date not possible to determine the specific degree of governmental affection. Therefore the used 
methodology can not be applied here. 
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Market failures occur when perfect market conditions are violated and inefficient allocations 
of goods and services are the outcome. This is in line with the definition by Bator (1958), 
where an idealised system of price-market institutions fails to sustain desirable consumption 
or production activities. Putting it the other way around market efficiency means that 
competitive market solutions will lead to Pareto efficient solutions.  
The reasons for market failure are imbalanced market power, incomplete information, 
externalities or public goods issues. In environmental economics as well as adaptation 
processes especially the two last aspects can become relevant. Based on the description of 
Cornes and Sandler (1986) externalities are defined as actions of an individual or a producer, 
which have a positive or negative effect on other parties outside the certain market and are not 
internalised. In case of adaptation external effects can occur if individuals or one group adapt 
to climate change and these measures affect others. Private adaptation in the agricultural 
sector can serve as an example: If a farmer adapts to dryer weather conditions due to climate 
change by implementing an irrigation system and therefore taking ground water, the ground 
water level sinks and that may lead to lacks in other locations which may harm nature or 
human activities. The action of the farmer has therefore external effects, which justifies 
governmental intervention in adaptation.  
Public goods can be categorised as a special case of externalities (Bator 1958, Buchanan and 
Stubblebine 1962, Cornes and Sandler 1986), and are regularly provided by the government. 
Pure public goods contain two central qualities namely non-excludability and non-rivalry in 
consumption (Cowen 1988, Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1998), basing also on Samuelson’s 
theoretical framework (1954). An example with regard to adaptation processes is the 
implementation of early-warning-systems with publicly issued warnings. Another important 
example facilitating adaptation processes is the building of a knowledge base and 
dissemination of information on climate effects.   
However, non-excludability and non-rivalry in consumption with regard to public adaptation 
goods is not always fully given. The impacts of climate change are mainly on a regional or 
local level and therefore the adaptation measures benefit only a part of the population. Dykes 
protect only the people who live in areas in which floods are a likely risk. Therefore they are 
called local public goods. An efficient outcome of publicly taken adaptation measures on pure 
or impure public goods requires the cooperation of local, regional and national governments 
as well as supranational entities.  
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Equity aspects can justify government intervention even in the absence of market failure. 
Equity principles can be differentiated into horizontal and vertical fairness (Atkinson and 
Stiglitz 1980). Horizontal equity refers to the equal treatment of individuals, but if viewed on 
a national perspective horizontal equity can easily be extended to the equal treatment of 
regions or agglomerations. Vertical equity considers the different abilities to afford adaptation 
measures.  
Adaptation processes solely based on cost efficiency may not be considered as just 
(Mendelsohn 2000). For example the protection of one region from floods may be worth on 
cost-benefit criteria but for another region this might not apply. Horizontal equity, in contrast, 
would call for an equal treatment of both regions (and ultimately their inhabitants and users).  
Vertical equity would give case for the support of citizens in need which cannot afford certain 
adaptation goods. This shows that decisions based on pure cost-efficiency may well interfere 
with equity targets of the society.  
However, governments take the responsibility for adaptation measures of basic needs – even 
if they are not cost efficient – to ensure a minimal level of care for inhabitants in need. In 
social welfare states this is reasoned by the democratic voting process, where the voters can 
put pressure on the parliament. But also supranational regulations take social rights into 
account and demand from the countries social justice (see International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, GA resolution 2200A). In any case the pursuing of 
horizontal and vertical equity will call for governmental intervention into adaptation 
processes and thereby increases the fiscal effects. 
 
The governmental task to secure the supply of special goods is another reason for public 
action. The focus lies on elementary goods and services such as food, water and energy. All 
these sectors will have to adapt to changing climate, in due consideration of a secure supply. 
The energy sector is a special case for concerns about the security of supply and plays an 
important role in policy (Abbott 2001, Helm 2002, Barreto and Turton 2005). Beside network 
securities the diversification of energy resources and ensuring fairly and stable prices for 
investment decisions are aspects of security of supply within the energy market (Helm 2002). 
The security of supply has to be differentiated from pure supply issues, because the guarantee 
of supply is an additional service which may have characteristics of a public good (Abbott 
2001). Governmental action can proof as necessary to secure the provision of the goods itself 
and to secure the delivery. Water and energy transmission systems are typical examples where 
network externalities occur and a monopolistic provider can offer the service at lower costs 
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than a competitive market. Therefore governments regularly intervene by regulating prices. 
However, they intervene even beyond market failure rationales. The value of a secure supply 
itself is seen as a reason for setting legal frameworks and other interventions which foster an 
enduring supply of elementary goods. The Federal Network Agency in Germany serves as an 
example. This public institution not only regulates transmission prices, but also commits 
network operators to ensure an uninterrupted supply. Another example is the provision of 
drinking water during an extreme drought. The scarcity will lead to higher prices due to their 
price inelasticity at least in the short run. Although this will lead to market clearance and 
efficient outcomes, this might be unacceptable concerning public welfare. From this point of 
view, public action is required to ensure the satisfaction of basic human needs.  
 
In addition to fulfilling the tasks of a social planner in the case of market failure and for 
reasons of equity and security of supply, the government may engage economically in impact 
sectors. Like private foresters, energy suppliers and house-owners, the government may act in 
these markets as a profit-oriented market actor, which will have considerable effects on the 
public budgets. An obvious example is the ownership and maintenance (heating and cooling) 
of public buildings like schools and public administration buildings. But governmental 
engagement in economic processes also occurs in the forestry sector (government as owner of 
forests) and in energy supply (publicly owned transmission system operators).  
It should be noted that the analysis of budgetary effects through public ownership is totally 
different from the argumentation of governmental intervention in social planner tasks. While 
in the first case the government behaves basically as a private market participant; in the latter 
case it acts based on its sovereignty. In the first case it finances its activities by income 
reflecting the costs (at least this is principally possible); in the latter case the intervention is 
financed by tax revenue. However, both public activities cause budgetary effects and will 
therefore be examined commonly in this analysis, although their nature is so different. For the 
interpretation of results later on, it should be kept in mind that costs arising from public 
ownership may be “outsourced” (i.e. privatised) more easily than social planner tasks. Since 
these developments are hard to predict, we will base our analysis on the conditions found 
today. 
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4.2. Proposal of Public Shares per Sector 
4.2.1. Agriculture 
The estimates in literature have a large range. Fischer et al. (2007) propose adaptation costs 
only for irrigation amounting to 161 to 966 million € p.a. in Western Europe in 2030, based 
on different scenarios, with rising costs post 2030. Bosello et al. (2009) estimate a much 
larger value of 6,274 million € p.a. for irrigation in Western Europe in the 2060s. 
Governmental intervention, especially long-run structural changes, has a variety of reasons. 
The first one to be mentioned is the interaction between mitigation and adaptation. Certain 
adaptation measures may not be conducive to mitigation. Changing cultivation or livestock 
production techniques can lead to increasing GHG emissions. Economic efficiency would 
require a price setting on these emissions. A task of the government is to set frameworks and 
support adaptation strategies, in which the interactions are taken into account. The second 
reason for governmental intervention is facilitating of autonomous adaptation. The long-term 
adaptation measures show that distribution of information and provision of a regulative 
framework are the basis for private adaptation. This includes primarily knowledge about 
effectiveness of adaptation measures and the expected impacts of climate change, as well as 
regulation of property rights and tenancy rules. Another cause for the government to intervene 
is equity. Adaptation has the potential to become very costly. Especially countries, where 
agricultural production has a large share of the GDP, adaptation costs could lead to negative 
effects on its national or regional welfare. Also in the EU, where the economic importance of 
the agricultural production is relatively low, there are differences between the member states. 
Countries with a lower per capita income, particularly new member states, show a higher 
dependency on agriculture than richer member states. Moreover, the impacts of climate 
change may benefit Northern Europe while the Southern member states are rather 
disadvantaged. Therefore intergovernmental transfers would help to balance the inequalities. 
Equity aspects also play a role within one country. The provision of emergency relief after 
extreme weather events by the government can be justified, if farmers cannot afford proper 
insurance or the possible damages are not insurable at all. Furthermore, the security of food 
supply is also a topic for governmental adaptation policy. If one good is essential, the 
government should guarantee the security of supply. When it comes to food the decision 
about which types of crops are indispensible and to what extent the government should ensure 
the food supply is crucial. The attempt to quantify the shares of public expenditures to climate 
change adaptation in the agricultural sector is challenging. The majority of adaptation 
measures is autonomous. However, considering planned adaptation, equity and security of 
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supply aspects the expenditures are not entirely private. According to global estimations by 
IMF (2008) the public share of adaptation expenditures within agriculture, forestry and 
fishery is around 15%, which can be justified by our theoretical considerations. This translates 
into absolute values of approximately 940 million € p.a. only for irrigation in Western Europe 
in the 2060s; respectively 25 to 145 million € p.a. only for irrigation in Western Europe in 
2030, based on different scenarios, with rising costs post 2030. 
 
4.2.2. Forestry 
There are no specific data available about adaptation costs in the European forestry sector, so 
cost estimations and public expenditures cannot be numerically presented. Adaptation to 
climate change impacts in the forestry are mainly precautionary measures, such as the 
implementation of early warning systems, diversification of tree types and transformation to 
other tree types. The central characteristic of adaptation measures in the forest sector is their 
long anticipatory time horizon. Long growing periods and the relative impossibility of 
retrofitting call for early action. The government acts on the one hand as a social planner, who 
provides knowledge transfer and research issues as well as early warning systems. 
Furthermore it takes positive externalities of forests into account. These are for instance their 
CO2 compensation capacities, their positive effects on regional microclimates, on biodiversity 
and on local recreation. Finally, the state is owner of forests itself. The average share of total 
public ownership weighted by the production size is around 40% (own calculations based on 
Eurostat data). The shares in the different member states vary largely, such that a European 
mean value (even a weighted one) has to be interpreted with caution. This ownership 
approach can only serve as a first assessment about public shares of adaptation expenditures. 
Together with actions as a social planner, the actual share of total adaptation costs is 
somewhat higher than the ownership share. We propose a share applicable in Europe of 
around 45%. 
 
4.2.3. Flood Protection 
Summarised, the cost estimates for flood protection measures in Europe amount to annual 
costs of 281 to 4,022 million € for coastal protection in the EU, assuming different scenarios 
regarding sea level rise. Flood protection is a prime example for a public good. It resembles a 
form of joint adaptation which has to be provided by collective action and in most cases will 
be organised and financed by a governmental entity. Translated into budgetary effects, that 
means most (if not all) of the adaptation costs will be borne by public budgets. However, 
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assuming a public share of 100% of flood protection costs may be slightly overestimated, 
because some EU member states share the financial burden of flood protection with private 
actors (Policy Research Corporation 2009). After a review of the different funding regulations 
for coastal protection in the EU, we propose a public share of around 98%. That means, the 
public costs amount to 275 (in 2050, EU) to 3,950 million € (2060s, Western Europe), 
depending on the underlying sea level rise scenarios and assumptions. 
 
4.2.4. Water Supply 
Adaptation costs in the impact field of water supply are estimated at 251 to 875 million € in 
European OECD countries in 2030 (UNFCCC 2007); and 2,655 million € p.a. in Western 
Europe in the 2060s (Bosello et al. 2009). Governmental intervention in the water supply 
sector is mainly based on two rationales: First, networks for sewage or water supply create 
increasing returns to scale. The other is grounded in security-of-supply rationales. Obviously, 
water is an indispensible good for any economy of the world, which gives a strong case for 
governments to ensure the secure supply even under new conditions like climate change. For 
these reasons one can also expect direct governmental action to ensure drinking water supply 
in times of extreme droughts. Based on these considerations, we propose a public share of 
adaptation investment costs in the water supply field. Bräuer et al. (2009) assume a share of 
25% for Germany, which seems to be reasonable since great parts of the investment costs are 
refinanced by usage fees, so ultimately by private actors. However, public resources are still 
strained, for the abovementioned reasons of governmental interference. Due to a lack of 
detailed data of other EU member states, we assume the same portion to be realistic for the 
total EU. The budgetary effects of adaptation in water supply and sewage systems will 
therefore add up to approximately 60 to 220 million € p.a. in European OECD countries in 
2030, and 665 million € p.a. in Western Europe in the 2060s, based on different scenarios. 
 
4.2.5. Health 
In Western Europe, global warming could decrease total health expenditure by 563 million € 
p.a. in 2060-2065, as net effects of adverse temperature effects and a decrease of expenditures 
for cold-related diseases (Bosello et al. 2009). Contrary, in Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union adaptation of the health infrastructure could cause costs in the same order in the 
first half of the century (World Bank 2009). A great part of the adaptation related to health is 
taken autonomously, e.g. cooling homes and other behavioural changes. However, collective 
adaptation tends to cause higher costs. It is characterised by e.g. the provision of 
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infrastructure, dissemination of information, research and monitoring of climate change 
related diseases. The free market normally does not provide these goods, so these measures 
are mainly taken by the government and therefore cause public expenditures. Furthermore, 
when it comes to the provision of equal access to health care equity aspects play a role. On 
the one hand geographical distribution of medical care which means the number and 
distribution of physicians across the country is necessary to ensure equal access. On the other 
hand guaranteeing that the services are affordable for everyone is essential under equity 
aspects. Due to the lack of data about specific adaptation expenditures in the health sector we 
use the current public share of total health care expenditures as a proxy. The EU-wide public 
share weighted by total expenditures was around 77% in 2005 and 2006. Taking into account 
an ageing society and higher requests to the public infrastructure (e.g. heat wave early 
warning systems) we propose a slightly higher public share of ca. 80%. This means, public 
budgets in Western Europe are possibly unburdened by 450 million € p.a. in the 2060s 
(Bosello et al. 2009), whereas other literature suggests additional public costs in Eastern 
Europe of the same amount in 2010-2050 (World Bank 2009). 
 
4.2.6. Energy Supply 
The energy industry plays a central role in the climate change debate. But most of the 
scientific and public discussion concerns mitigation in the energy sector. For adaptation, the 
literature suggests following cost estimates: 563 million € p.a. in the 2060s for undefined 
adaptation measures in Western Europe; 1 billion € in 2050 for cooling measures in thermal 
power plants in the EU27 plus Norway and Switzerland. Energy networks have always been 
regulated in some way due to network externalities. In the EU member states, the regulation 
itself is currently characterised by two slightly different strategies. In both alternatives the 
network is operated by a transmission system operator (TSO), which is separated from the 
generating companies (legally, by management or by ownership, see Sioshansi and 
Pfaffenberger 2006). Either the TSOs are private companies, regulated by a governmental 
authority (e.g. the Federal Network Agency in Germany), which sets price ceilings or return-
on-investment-ceilings. Moreover, TSOs are legally committed to secure an enduring energy 
supply. In the other alternative TSOs are publicly owned companies, as it is the case in most 
EU member states. In both cases TSOs should charge prices that ensure a cost-effective 
operation of the network, without any cross-subsidies. That means if budgetary costs rise due 
to some adaptation of energy networks by state-owned TSOs, these costs should be reflected 
by higher transmission fees ultimately charged from the consumer. So finally, from an 
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economic point of view the end consumers will be affected and not the public purse, 
regardless of the ownership structure of the TSO. Another situation arises in the context of 
security-of-supply-considerations. No government would accept an enduring breakdown of 
power networks or even the danger of such an event. Budgetary effects may possibly arise if 
TSOs are not enough financially capable for the necessary investments in climate-proof grids, 
and ask for financial support. For ensuring the security of supply, power plants also have to 
tackle the problem of insufficient cooling water supply. If governments have a high interest in 
the secure supply also during large-scale heat waves, they might implement policies ensuring 
that power generators care for these events, which would then possibly cause expenses. 
Equity-related issues may affect the fiscal adaptation costs in the energy sector as well. 
Vertical equity considerations may call for higher public support of citizens in need if the 
energy retail prices rise because of climate adaptation. To sum up these aspects of 
governmental intervention in energy supply, we recognize the significant regulative 
interventions, but put the overall budgetary costs of adaptation on the energy supply side at 
not more than 5% of the total adaptation costs. Note that this guess is underlying the 
assumption of no cross-subsidising of the regular network operation. Combining this share 
with the available cost estimates, we conclude the following fiscal costs of adaptation in the 
energy supply: 28 million € p.a. in the 2060s in Western Europe; around 50 million € in 2050 
in the EU27 plus Norway and Switzerland. 
 
4.2.7. Energy demand 
Adaptation of demand is likely to result in more demand for cooling and less demand for 
heating energy. Although this behaviour seems trivial and could be interpreted as a form of 
impact, it fulfils the criteria of a reactive adaptation measure, as defined by the IPCC (IPCC 
2007). Therefore, it will be included in this analysis. Tol 2002 estimates a net effect of 
additional energy costs adding up to over 6 billion € p.a. in European OECD countries (Tol 
2002). Another study suggests net savings due to decreased heating needs and increased 
electricity needs for cooling of ca. 28 billion € in 2050 in the total EU27 plus Norway and 
Switzerland (Jochem and Schade 2009). The large range of these figures highlights the 
immense uncertainty of available adaptation cost estimates. The various results cannot only 
be explained by differences in time horizons, spatial coverage and underlying scenarios; there 
remains a large amount of scientific and technological uncertainty. The effects are relatively 
high, compared to other adaptation costs, and vary strongly across Europe and among 
different studies. Budgetary effects of this adaptation behaviour may arise to the extent 
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buildings are owned and maintained (heated and cooled) by governmental entities. Thus, the 
public share in the effect of demand adjustment hinges on the share of public buildings in the 
total building stock. Bräuer et al. (2009) estimate a ratio of public buildings over the stock of 
total buildings of 10% for Germany. An analysis of Eurostat statistics on fixed assets shows 
that the German value may serve as an approximation for the EU average (weighted by the 
total fixed assets), though the differences within Europe are high. For the aggregate of all EU 
members, a ratio of 10-15% seems reasonable, which means that 10-15% of the demand 
adjustment effect will affect the public budgets. Expressed in figures, this means that in the 
total EU energy costs may rise by 600 million € to 1 billion € p.a. due to the cooling of public 
buildings (Tol 2002). Contrary, basing on the study of Jochem and Schade (2009), there will 
be energy cost savings for the public purse amounting to 2.7 to 4.2 billion € in 2050. These 
values, however, underlie high uncertainty with regard to the technological development 
within the 21st century. 
 
4.2.8. Transport 
In the transport sector, cost estimates range from 3 to 6 billion € for the adaptation of 
infrastructure in the EU27 plus Norway and Switzerland in 2050 (Jochem and Schade 2009). 
Beside impacts on traffic safety, the infrastructure is the most critical issue in the transport 
sector. Governmental intervention in the transport sector is mainly reasoned by market failure 
issues. Road networks which are free of charge and open to the public constitute a public 
good. There are, however, roads and other transport infrastructure co-financed by user fees, 
but the bulk of transport networks in Europe (in terms of km) are still free of charge, and 
mostly financed by the public sector. Furthermore privately owned roads and railways exist. 
Unfortunately, data of ownership structures is not available on the EU level. Knowledge 
about the private and public ownerships of the networks would provide a basis for an attempt 
to propose the government share of adaptation expenditures. Nevertheless, the share is 
expected to be high (we assume more than 90%), due to high public engagement in the 
transport infrastructure. Even if there are possibilities to exclude users from road services and 
thereby introduce user-fees, governmental intervention may occur due to security-of-supply 
and equity rationales. If user-fee-based networks fail to provide an adequate quantity (e.g. 
distribution of airports or railway stations over the country) and quality (e.g. paved roads) of 
infrastructure, the government may step in to ensure the access to transport services for each 
region and each member of society in need. Thereby the public share of total adaptation 
investments may rise beyond the actual share of public network infrastructure. We assume 
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95%, admitting that this is a rough guess which can only serve as a first attempt to approach 
the actual public burden. This would translate in absolute budgetary costs of approximately 
2.9 to 5.7 billion € for infrastructure in the EU27 plus Norway and Switzerland in 2050. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
In the previous sections we developed a method to valuate the direct budgetary effect of 
adaptation to climate change and gave data-based and informed guesses of public costs to be 
expected based on literature on adaptation costs. These numerical conclusions can only serve 
as a first rough insight into the fiscal effects of adaptation, ignoring indirect effects and 
covering only few impact sectors. Moreover, due to a lack of detailed data, we could not 
derive public costs in the cross-sectoral impact sector “Extreme weather events”. Admittedly, 
according to the literature review the highest adaptation costs may occur there. But as there is 
no information available which actors are affected by these costs and how exactly the costs 
arise, it is to date not possible to determine the specific degree of governmental affection. 
Therefore, the used methodology could not be applied here. However, the results highlight 
certain impact fields with relatively high public costs, compared to others where the total 
adaptation costs may be high, but the public burden is expectedly low. Figure 1 depicts 
graphically the public burden in the different impact sectors. The comparability of the bars is 
limited, as the values are derived from different studies (including different methodologies, 
models, assumptions, time horizons and climate scenarios). Therefore we included the lowest 
and the highest cost value for each sector, so that the large range of possible outcomes is 
illustrated. Detailed information on underlying scenarios, time horizons and assumptions can 
be found in the literature review in matrix form in the appendix. The upper part of the figure 
shows the estimated adaptation costs, divided into public and private costs, as they appear in 
the matrix. Due to very high negative costs in the energy demand sector, the other entries are 
hardly visible. That is why we included the lower part of the figure, where the energy demand 
sector is dropped to increase the visibility of the other sectors.  
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Figure 1: Direct public and private adaptation costs (upper part including energy demand, lower part 
without energy demand).  
Public and Private adaptation costs in Europe (direct costs)
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Direct budgetary costs due to adaptation are comparably high for transport infrastructure and 
flood protection. In other impact sectors (e.g. agriculture) adaptation may cause higher costs, 
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but these are mainly financed by private actors. Direct effects due to energy demand are 
highly variable over regions (Jochem and Schade 2009, Eskeland and Mideksa 2009), so the 
figure for total EU (savings of up to 28 billion € p.a.) has to be interpreted with caution. All 
cost estimates (including energy demand, transport and flood protection) are subject to high 
uncertainties with regard to climatic change scenarios and the future socio-economic 
development. E.g., the budgetary effect of flood adaptation is expected to be in the range 
between 137 million € p.a. (EC12 without Eastern Germany, by 2100, basing on Fankhauser 
1992) and 3,950 million € p.a. (Western Europe in the 2060s, Bosello et al. 2009), depending 
on the underlying assumptions and scenarios. Regarding the budgetary effects of adaptation 
of the health sector even the sign is not sure. Those high uncertainty ranges call for further 
quantitative research, in particular focussing on regional or local vulnerability heterogeneities. 
Although the uncertainty is still very high, this analysis can serve as a first, theory-grounded 
and reasonable insight of which sectors cause which magnitude of budgetary effects. 
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A APPENDIX 
A.1 Matrix 
Please see next page. 
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Table 1: Adaptation costs in Germany summarised from the literature, normalised to annual costs in € in 
prices of 2005. 
Agriculture Water supply 
Inland  
floods 
Coastal  
floods Scenario Methodology / Model Year Entries million 
2005€ p.a. 
million 
2005€ p.a. 
million 
2005€ p.a. 
million 
2005€ p.a. 
Costs     
  
  
past data Econometric study of past data 1985-2007 
Source         
Costs     
  
  
past data Review of past expenditure 2008-2009 
Source         
Costs     
  
143 (not only due 
to climate change) 
SLR: 15-50 
cm by 
2100; 
Protection 
level: 1:100 
to 1:400 
Review of 
scheduled 
expenditure 
1998-2015 
Source     
  
Policy Research 
Corporation 2009 
Costs     
  
46 (one-time 
investment, only 
Lower Weser river) Case study n.a. 
Source     
  
Liebermann and 
Zimmermann 2000 
Costs     
  
31 (one-time 
investment, only 4 
focus points at the 
North Sea, total 
dike length 85.2 
km)  
SLR: 70 
cm, 
maintain 
current 
protection 
level 
Case study n.a. 
Source       Mai et al. 2004 
Costs       23 SLR: 1 m 
by 2100 
Case study, 
expert opinion 2050 Source       Bräuer et al. 2009 
Costs       91 SLR: 1 m 
by 2100 
Case study, 
expert opinion 2100 Source       Bräuer et al. 2009 
Costs     
  
+ 75% (only 
Wadden Sea) SLR: 50 cm 
by 2050 Case study 2050 
Source       CWSS 2001 
Costs   37-711     n.a. Case study, rough estimates 2050-2100 Source   Bräuer et al. 2009     
Costs     
  
  
A2 
Forecast of 
heating degree 
days, estimates 
2100 
Source         
Costs 1.2-7.5 (only fruit sector in Hesse)     
  
B2 Case study 2050 
Source HLUG 2005       
Costs 116       T: 4,5°C by 
2100 WIAGEM Model 2050 Source Kemfert 2007       
Costs 480       T: 4,5°C by 
2100 WIAGEM Model 2100 Source Kemfert 2007       
Costs       17.3 
A2, SLR: 
relatively 
50-100 cm 
by 2100, 
protection 
level: 100 
years event 
DIVA Model 2000-2100 
Source     
  
Costa et al. 2009 
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Health Tourism Energy Transport Weather  Extremes Total 
Exchange and  
inflation 
million 
2005€ p.a. 
million  
2005€ p.a. 
million 
2005€ p.a. 
million 
2005€ p.a. 
million 
2005€ p.a. 
million 
2005€ p.a. in millions 
        
no significant 
influence on public 
budgets 
  
        Lis and Nickel 2009     
  65 (only artificial snow)         
  alpMedia 2004         
No information 
about price level 
            
            
No information 
about price level 
            
            
87.75 2000DM = 
44.9 2000€ = 45.7 
2005€ 
            
            
No information 
about price level 
            
            
            
            
25 2007€ = 22.8 
2005€ 
            
            
  
            
            
40 2007€ = 36.5 
2005€ 
    - 4863 (less energy demand)       
    Bräuer et al. 2009       
5000 2007€ = 
4862.8 2005€ 
            
            
No information 
about price level 
552 220   235*)     
Kemfert 2007 Kemfert 2007   Kemfert 2007     
No information 
about price level 
2332     976*)     
Kemfert 2007     Kemfert 2007     
No information 
about price level 
            
            
0.099346% of 
2007GDP for 100 
years; 0.000993% of 
2007GDP for 1 year 
= 28.68 2008USD = 
19.60 2008€ = 17.31 
2005€ 
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Table 2: Adaptation costs in Finland summarised from the literature, normalised to annual costs in € in 
prices of 2005. 
Agriculture Water supply 
Inland  
floods 
Coastal  
floods Scenario Methodology / Model Year Entries million  
2005€ p.a. 
million 
2005€ p.a.
million  
2005€ p.a. 
million  
2005€ p.a. 
Costs         past data Econometric study of past data 1985-2007 
Source         
Costs     <11 
A1T Estimates based on literature review 2020 Source     Perrels et al. 2005 
Costs     <11 
A1T Estimates based on literature review 2050 Source     Perrels et al. 2005 
Costs     <11 
A1T Estimates based on literature review 2080 Source     Perrels et al. 2005 
Costs     0.005-7 (initial investment) 
1-10 (initial 
investment, only 
Pori) 
Larger 
future 
floods 
Estimates based on 
literature review 2070 
Source     Silander et al. 2006 Silander et al. 2006 
Costs       0.45 SLR: 60 
cm, 
maintain 
current 
protection 
level 
Review of 
scheduled 
expenditure 
1998-2015 
Source       Policy Research Corporation 2009 
Costs         n.a. 
Simulation, 
Estimates based on 
literature review 
2030 
Source         
Costs         
A1B        
Simulation, 
Estimates based on 
literature review 
2100 
Source         
Costs       5.15 
A2, SLR: 
relatively 
50-100 cm 
by 2100, 
protection 
level: 100 
years event 
DIVA Model 2000-2100 
Source       Costa et al. 2009 
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Health Tourism Energy Transport Weather Extremes Total 
Exchange and 
inflation 
million  
2005€ p.a. 
million  
2005€ p.a. 
million  
2005€ p.a. 
million   
2005€ p.a. 
million 
 2005€ p.a. 
million  
2005€ p.a. in millions 
        
no significant 
influence on public 
budgets 
  
        Lis and Nickel 2009   
  
    1.1 (only maintenance)       
    Perrels et al. 2005       
    1.1 (only maintenance)       
    Perrels et al. 2005       
    1.1 (only maintenance)       
    Perrels et al. 2005       
1 2000€ = 1.093 
2005€            
            
            
No information 
about price level 
            
            
No information 
about price level 
    -2% (less energy demand) 
10-20 (buildings 
and transport 
infrastructure)  
    
    Kirkinen et al. 2005 Carter et al. 2007     
No information 
about price level 
    -4.5% (less residential electricity demand) 
>20 (buildings 
and transport 
infrastructure)  
    
    Eskeland and Mideksa 2009 Carter et al. 2007     
No information 
about price level 
            
            
0.422518% of 
2007GDP for 100 
years; 
0.00422518% of 
2007GDP for 1 
year = 8.13 
2008USD =  5.55 
2008€ = 5.15 
2005€  
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Table 3: Adaptation costs in Italy summarised from the literature, normalised to annual costs in € in 
prices of 2005. 
Agriculture Water supply 
Inland 
floods 
Coastal  
floods Scenario Methodology / Model Year Entries million  
2005€ p.a. 
million 
2005€ p.a.
million 
2005€ p.a.
million  
2005€ p.a. 
Costs         VSL (Value of a 
statistical Life) 
median WTP 
Risk Reduction 
to die on health 
effects of heat 
waves 
survey 2005 
Source         
Costs         VSL (Value of a 
statistical Life) 
mean WTP 
Risk Reduction 
to die on health 
effects of heat 
waves 
survey 2005 
Source         
Costs       
1.5-2.1 (in 2030) 
only Venice but without 
MOSE Discount rate 3.5 Case study 2030 
Source       Carraro and Sgobbi 2008 
Costs       
790.8 (in 2009-2011, 
including MOSE 
project) 
23.30 (in 2012-2015, 
MOSE project 
completed) 
n.a. 
Review of 
scheduled 
expenditure 
2009-2015 
Source       Policy Research Corporation 2009 
Costs       
4680 total for MOSE 
project (no time 
horizon) 
n.a. 
expenditure 
forecast for 
MOSE project 
n.a. 
Source       
Ministry for 
Infrastructure and 
Transport 2009 
Costs       26.9 
A2, SLR: 
relatively 50-100 
cm by 2100, 
protection level: 
100 years event 
DIVA Model 2000-2100 
Source       Costa et al. 2009 
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Health Tourism Energy Transport Weather Extremes Total 
Exchange and  
inflation 
million  
2005€ p.a. 
million  
2005€ p.a. 
million 
2005€ p.a.
million  
2005€ p.a.
million 
 2005€ p.a.
million 
2005€ p.a. in millions 
0,73           
Alberini and Chiabai 2005           
1,533           
Alberini and Chiabai 2005           
No information 
about price level 
            
            
No information 
about price level 
            
            
No information 
about price level 
            
            
No information 
about price level 
            
            
0.23037% of 
2007GDP for 100 
years; 0.0023037% 
of 2007GDP for 1 
year =  42.5 
2008USD =  29.04 
2008€ = 26.93 
2005€  
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Table 4: Adaptation costs in Europe summarised from the literature, normalised to annual costs in € in 
prices of 2005. 
Agriculture Water  supply 
Inland  
floods Region Scenario Methodology / Model Year Entries million  
2005€ p.a. 
million  
2005€ p.a. 
million  
2005€ p.a. 
Costs       
EU 
SLR: 25 cm, 
total 
protection 
Global CGE, 8 
regions 2050 
Source       
2020-2029 Costs       
2080-2089 Costs       
A2, SLR: 88 
cm by 2100, 
optimal 
protection   Source       
2020-2029 Costs       
2080-2089 Costs       
EU27 
B2, SLR: 9 
cm by 2100, 
optimal 
protection 
  
  Source       
2030 Costs 966 (only irrigation)     
2050 Costs 1544 (only irrigation)     
2080 Costs 2702 (only irrigation)     
A2r 
(population 
growth 
lower than 
A2)    Source Fischer et al. 2007     
2030 Costs 290 (only irrigation)     
2050 Costs 450 (only irrigation)     
2080 Costs 547 (only irrigation)     B1 
Climate model 
Hadley, 
agriculture 
model AEZ-
BLS, cost 
estimates 
  Source Fischer et al. 2007     
2030 Costs 161 (only irrigation)     
2050 Costs 322 (only irrigation)     
2080 Costs 611 (only irrigation)     
A2r 
(population 
growth 
lower than 
A2)    Source Fischer et al. 2007     
2030 Costs 225 (only irrigation)     
2050 Costs 290 (only irrigation)     
2080 Costs 386 (only irrigation)     
Western 
Europe 
B1 
Climate model 
CSIRO, 
agriculture 
model AEZ-
BLS, cost 
estimates 
  Source Fischer et al. 2007     
Costs 6274 (only irrigation) 2655   
Western 
Europe Source Bosello  et al. 2009 
Bosello 
 et al. 2009   
Costs 9894 (only irrigation) 4263   
Eastern 
Europe 
2x CO2, T = 
2.5°C, SLR: 
44 cm 
AD-WITCH, 
CGE ICES, cost 
estimates 
2060-2065
Source Bosello  et al. 2009 
Bosello  
et al. 2009   
Costs       
Europe 
AD-RICE 
(emissions < 
B2, T = 2°C 
by 2100) 
Global CGE, 13 
regions, optimal 
adaptation and 
mitigation 
by 2155 
Source       
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Coastal  
floods Health Tourism Energy Transport 
Weather  
Extremes Total 
Exchange and 
inflation 
million  
2005€ p.a. 
million  
2005€ p.a. 
million  
2005€ p.a. 
million  
2005€ p.a. 
million 
2005€ p.a. 
million  
2005€ p.a. 
million  
2005€ p.a. in millions 
281           
0.022% of 
GDP (indirect 
effects through 
investments in 
coastal 
protection) 
Bosello et al. 
2007           
Bosello et al. 
2007 
11213 
1997USD = 
9921.5 
1997ECU = 
11254.3 2005€ 
for time span 
by 2050 
(assumed 
period 2010-
2050 = 40 
years) 
1172             
3016             
PESETA Final 
Report 2009             
352             
314             
PESETA Final 
Report 2009             
1013.4 1995€ 
= 1171.9 
2005€ 
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
no information 
about price 
level, assuming 
price level of 
2005: 30 Gm³ 
* 0.04 
2005USD/m³ = 
1200 
2005USD = 
965.3 2005€ 
4022 -563   1935   50919 67248 
Bosello 
 et al. 2009 
Bosello  
et al. 2009   
Bosello  
et al. 2009   
Bosello  
et al. 2009 
Bosello  
et al. 2009 
241 -80   0   1931 16329 
Bosello  
et al. 2009 
Bosello  
et al. 2009   
Bosello  
et al. 2009   
Bosello  
et al. 2009 
Bosello 
et al. 2009 
7800 
2005USD = 
6274 2005€ 
            
NPV of annual 
flows = 0.06% 
of NPV GDP 
            de Bruin et al. 2009 
NPV of annual 
flows, no price 
level 
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Agriculture Water  supply 
Inland  
floods Region Scenario Methodology / Model Year Entries million  
2005€ p.a. 
million  
2005€ p.a. 
million 
2005€ p.a. 
2020 Costs       
2035 Costs       
2050 Costs       
EU27 + 
Norway + 
Switzerland 
4°C 
warming by 
2100 
Partial 
Equilibrium 
models 
  Source       
Costs   875   A1B, SLR: 9 
cm by 2030 
Estimates based 
on literature 
review 
2030 
Source   UNFCCC 2007   
Costs   251   
B1, SLR: 9 
cm by 2030 
Estimates based 
on literature 
review 
2030 
Source   UNFCCC 2007   
Costs       
SLR: 1 m by 
2100 
Estimates based 
on literature 
review 
2000-2100
Source       
Costs       
OECD 
Europe 
T: 1°C 
Estimates based 
on literature 
review 
n.a. 
Source       
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Coastal  
floods Health Tourism Energy Transport 
Weather  
Extremes Total 
Exchange and 
inflation 
million  
2005€ p.a. 
million  
2005€ p.a. 
million 
2005€ p.a. 
million  
2005€ p.a. 
million  
2005€ p.a. 
million  
2005€ p.a. 
million  
2005€ p.a. in millions 
      
- 6941 (less energy 
demand) + 4300 
(additional cooling 
investments) 
      
      
- 15602 (less energy 
demand) + 6200 
(additional cooling 
investments) 
      
      
- 27663 (less energy 
demand) + 8400 
(additional cooling 
investments) + 1000 
(additional 
investments in power 
plant cooling 
measures) 
3000-6000 
(only 
infrastructure)
    
      Jochem and Schade 2009 
Jochem and 
Schade 2009     
No information 
about price 
level 
593         804 - 13715    
UNFCCC 
2007         
UNFCCC 
2007   
502         804 - 13715    
UNFCCC 
2007         
UNFCCC 
2007   
87000 
2005USD for 
investment by 
2030, 25% for 
adaptation 
21750 
2005USD = 
17496 2005€ 
for time span, 
875 2005€ as 
annual costs 
1612             
Tol 2002             
No information 
about price 
level, assuming 
price level of 
2000: 136000 
2000USD = 
147516.5 
2000€ = 
161238.3 
2005€, original 
results for 
period of 100 
years 
  
no adaptation 
costs for 
diarrhea, 
malnutrion 
and malaria 
  
6350 (additional 
cooling demand, 
saved heating 
expenditure) 
      
  
Tol and 
Dowlatabadi 
2001 
  Tol 2002       
No information 
about price 
level, assuming 
price level of 
1995: 7100 
1995USD = 
5451.4 
1995ECU = 
6350.2 2005€ 
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Agriculture Water  supply 
Inland 
floods Region Scenario Methodology / Model Year Entries million  
2005€ p.a. 
million  
2005€ p.a. 
million  
2005€ p.a. 
2010-2019 Costs       
2020-2029 Costs       
2030-2039 Costs       
2040-2049 Costs       
NCAR 
(wet) 
  Source       
2010-2019 Costs       
2020-2029 Costs       
2030-2039 Costs       
2040-2049 Costs       
CSIRO 
(dry) 
  Source       
Costs 80 (research) 80 (irrigation) 
80 (only 
infrastructure)  
+ 724 
1125 
NCAR 
(wet) 2010-2050
Source World Bank 2009 World Bank 2009 
World Bank 
2009 
Costs 80 (research) 80 (irrigation) - 241 483 CSIRO 
(dry) 2010-2050
Source World Bank 2009 World Bank 2009 
World Bank 
2009 
2010-2019 Costs       
2020-2029 Costs       
2030-2039 Costs       
2040-2049 Costs       
Eastern 
Europe and 
FSU 
SLR: 87,2 
cm by 2100 
Estimates 
based on 
literature 
review 
  Source       
Costs       
EC12 
without 
GDR 
SLR: 50 
cm and T: 
2,5°C by 
2100 
Partial 
Equilibrium 2000-2100
Source       
Costs       
Western 
Europe + 
Croatia, 
Cypros, 
Slovenia 
unmitigated 
IPCC IS92a 
scenario, 
medium 
estimate 
Simulation, 
Estimates 
based on 
literature 
review 
up to 2030
Source       
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Coastal  
floods Health Tourism Energy Transport 
Weather  
Extremes Total 
Exchange and 
inflation 
million  
2005€ p.a. 
million  
2005€ p.a. 
million  
2005€ p.a. 
million  
2005€ p.a. 
million  
2005€ p.a. 
million  
2005€ p.a. 
million  
2005€ p.a. in millions 
          1210   
          1530   
          3540   
          4260   
          World Bank 2009   
          563   
          885   
          1210   
          1690   
          World Bank 2009   
  563 (only infrastructure)   
483 (only 
infrastructure) 
804 (only 
infrastructure)     
  World Bank 2009   
World Bank 
2009 
World Bank 
2009     
              
              
1930             
2090             
2250             
2490             
World 
Bank 2009             
1 2005USD = 
0.8044 2005€ 
140     
7014 (only 
additional 
electricity 
expenditures) 
      
Fankhauser 
1992     
Fankhauser 
1992       
No information 
about price 
level, assuming 
price level = 
1990: 140 
1990USD = 
110 1990ECU 
= 140 2005€ 
  
no adaptation 
costs for 
diarrhea, 
malnutrion and 
malaria 
            
  Ebi 2007             
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A.2 Description of the Matrix 
A.2.1 Regional coverage 
The first column of the matrix indicates the region for which the costs are estimated. Note that 
for European adaptation costs some studies refer to total Europe, some to the EU in a specific 
composition and others to the European OECD countries. Particularly problematic are the 
figures for Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, as only a small and unknown part of 
these figures are attributable to current EU member states. Interpreting the entries of the 
matrix, this has to be kept in mind. 
 
A.2.2 Scenarios 
In the second column, the climate scenarios and socio-economic scenarios which form the 
basis for any calculation or estimation are named. This information is particularly important 
to classify the subsequent results and to get an insight whether they are rather optimistic or 
pessimistic. Moreover, in studies with identical regional covering and scenarios, time spans 
and methodologies can be compared. Unfortunately, the inadequate data provides us with 
hardly more than one comparable country-specific study. Nevertheless, as knowledge about 
adaptation costs is evolving, there may be the opportunity to gradually fill the numerous gaps 
in the matrix. This is possible only under the condition that the development of climate 
science does not lead to significantly new scenarios, because then again results would lose 
their direct comparability.  
Beside the scenarios regarding climate and socio-economic developments, adaptation 
scenarios are of great relevance. For example, there is a fundamental difference between the 
assumption of “total protection” of the current shoreline (i.e. protecting the land from every 
possible storm surge) and the assumption of “optimal coastal protection”, which would 
incorporate the costs of protection into the decision. In the latter case abandoning highly 
endangered areas will be the consequence and the total costs will be lower than in the former 
case. In the real world, there is often a policy of determining a certain protection level, since 
the realisation of optimal protection is not always practicable due to lack of relevant data. A 
protection level of, say 1:400 means that the protection structures are designed to resist an 
event which statistically occurs every 400 years only. By setting these lump-sum protection 
levels the policy-makers avoid extensive cost-benefit-calculations for each coastal site. For 
the magnitude of adaptation costs, these adaptation decisions are of course crucial and every 
policy change significantly changes the involved costs. 
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A.2.3 Time coverage and annualisation 
Sometimes the cost estimates are calculated for only one point in time in the future, e.g. 2050, 
and sometimes they are estimated for a series of consecutive years, e.g. the annual value will 
occur every year between 2020 and 2030. Hence, the year (respectively period) is indicated in 
the fourth column. By comparing estimates from similar studies with different time horizons, 
one can find an increase in expected adaptation costs over time. This is not surprising as 
climate damages increase over time, which also induces higher adaptation needs.  
Few sources give detailed information on annual costs for a given time period. One of them is 
Policy Research Corporation (2009), which names the scheduled expenditures for coastal 
protection by reviewing national and regional master plans up to 2015. In these cases we only 
give the average annual costs. As long as the annual amounts do not differ considerably, this 
is reasonable – in the other cases we have indicated the exact annual costs.  
For reasons of comparability we derived the annual costs if costs were given for a time period 
longer than one year. That is, numbers calculated for a period of N years were divided by N to 
receive the annual costs. This implies basically two simplifying assumptions: Firstly, 
adaptation costs are assumed to be constant over time. In reality, adaptation costs may 
increase over time (see above); but as no information about the exact distribution is given we 
choose the equal distribution. Secondly, we ignore inflation. The presented data are in prices 
of 2005 and therefore do not reflect price changes over time. The simple division by N does 
not, however, assume a discount rate of zero. The matrix just gives the estimated adaptation 
costs which may occur at a future point of time. We do not calculate these future costs in 
present values – only in this case discounting would become relevant.  
After all, the matrix cannot provide a detailed budget-like expenditure plan for adaptation in 
the coming decades. It can just serve as a first rough insight into expected costs, partly based 
on best-guess-results.  
 
A.2.4 The division into impact sectors 
The presented adaptation costs are partitioned into different impact fields, as most adaptation 
measures are to reduce damages in specific sectors and can therefore be assigned to these 
sectors.  
Special attention should be paid to the cross section sector “Weather Extremes”. The literature 
cited in the matrix refers primarily to costs arising from adaptation of the constructed 
infrastructure, i.e. making the structures resilient to extreme weather events. These costs are 
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hardly attributable to any impact sector. At the same time, they are quite high, e.g. up to an 
annual value of 50.9 billion € in the 2060s for Western Europe (Bosello et al. 2009).  
By the partition into different impact sectors the matrix provides a first insight into the current 
state of research of adaptation costs. It becomes clear that to date most cost estimates refer to 
coastal protection. It should not be derived, however, that this is the sector with the highest 
costs. It is just saying that here the impacts and adaptation techniques are quite well studied 
and the costs are well known, given an assumption for the future sea-level rise. In fact, the 
global adaptation cost study of UNFCCC (2007) estimates the costs of coastal protection in 
2030 at a comparably low level. Adaptation in other fields like agriculture, forestry, fisheries, 
ecosystems, and – most outstanding – infrastructure will be much costlier, according to this 
source. However, these estimates come with a high level of uncertainty, whereas the 
knowledge of coastal protection costs is relatively well developed. On the other side, by 
comparing the sector-specific entries of coastal protection one can see a wide range of results 
even in that best-established research field. For great parts the differences can be reasoned by 
different assumptions regarding the sea-level rise or protection level, which is then indicated 
in the “Scenario” column.  
The last column named “Total” contains results of studies not focussing on specific sectors, 
but on the total impact of adaptation costs on social welfare. There are only very few studies 
available which try to aggregate adaptation costs throughout the total economy. In principal, 
we can also sum up the entries of one line in the matrix to calculate the direct costs of 
adaptation in the analysed sectors and thereby yield an approximate value for total direct 
adaptation costs in the economy. A prerequisite of this addition would be the use of identical 
scenarios, regional and time coverage, division into impact sectors and methods. Thus, the 
data actually do not allow a reasonable addition of single values due to lack of comparable 
results. Note that additional indirect effects mentioned in the introductory section are 
completely neglected if we just added up the different sector impacts.  
 
A.2.5 Exchange rates and inflation 
The numerical entries in the matrix are – if not indicated otherwise – annual adaptation costs 
in million €, in prices of 2005, and thereby comparable in terms of currency and price levels. 
The column named “Exchange and inflation” gives the original value found in primary 
literature and the calculation to € in prices of 2005. For the translation of USD into € we used 
the average market exchange rate of the year of the respective study.  
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In a second step, we adjusted for price level changes. E.g., the construction of a dike in the 
year 2000 will be more expensive than the same dike constructed in 1990. To make both 
estimates comparable, we used price indices to standardise all figures to prices of 2005. For 
capital-intensive adaptation in studies about one specific country it appears reasonable to 
apply national price indices for capital formation. For adaptation measures not sufficiently 
concretised we used the national GDP price indices. For studies with European coverage we 
applied equivalent price indices for the €-area as an approximation for the price level changes 
in the studied area. 
